




**C S O P N U**

**Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda**

*"for a just and lasting peace"*

# **Learning from Past Experience, Designing a Better Future**

**Toward a successful Disarmament, Demobilisation,  
Reintegration & Resettlement in Northern Uganda**



**May 2008**

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# **Learning from Past Experience, Designing a Better Future**

**Toward a successful Disarmament, Demobilisation,  
Reintegration & Resettlement in Northern Uganda**

# Executive Summary

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The research commissioned by Civil Society Organisations for peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU), a coalition of 77 local and international civil society organizations working towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern Uganda was undertaken in February and March of 2008. The research was commissioned to act as a contribution to the discussions and agreements on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in the Juba Peace Process for ex-LRA combatants, and to provide lessons learned and recommendations for implementation of DDR in Uganda. The research is based on experiences and lessons learnt from Uganda and three other African countries who experienced similar civil war.

## Lessons Learned from DDR in Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Liberia

Most DDR processes seriously under estimate the number of participants and focus primarily on Disarmament and Demobilization.

Children are forced to participate in conflicts and need special attention during DDR. They should not be part of the adult DDR process.

Women participate in conflicts, both on a forced and voluntarily basis. Entry criteria to DDR processes must be such that they include women's participation and enable them to break unwanted relationships.

Time spent at encampment sites should be as short as possible, but long enough to enable participants to have an effective and meaningful experience.

Information about processes, services available, etc. needs to be clear and easily found to avoid misconceptions and unrealistic expectations.

A central database of reporters and others eligible for DDR will help avoid duplication of efforts and benefits

Skills training needs to be based on market surveys (demand driven) to ensure that skills obtained are actually useful.

Training needs to be long enough to provide participants with long-term skills, and when necessary should be accompanied by toolkits and start-up capital.

Providing support only to ex-combatants creates resentment amongst communities who have also suffered adversely from conflict.

Building local capacity can help provide programs which provide long-term sustainability.

## Uganda

Uganda is in a unique position to be able to conduct a DDR process which is based on lessons learned from several years of experience from similar processes across Sub-Saharan Africa. The number of expected returnees from the LRA is estimated to be 3,000. It is very likely that the number will increase if large numbers of people who have already returned, but not registered with the Amnesty Commission, find they can benefit from the DDR programs.

## Reception Centers

The majority of reception centers work primarily with women and children. The average stay is between 2-6 weeks depending on needs.

3 out of the 6 people who were interviewed at the reception centers claim that formerly abducted women want to stay with their bush "husbands". This is contrary to research findings in the North and might imply that economic and social reintegration is not working properly. If the women are given the opportunity to become financially independent it is highly unlikely they will continue the relationship.

Young mothers with children are the most vulnerable of all returnees. Having a child is a key factor hindering resettlement and reintegration.

Most centers lack qualified personnel for psychosocial counseling.

Few centers offer their services to adult males. Many of the male reporters wish to join the UPDF. However this is a choice made due to lack of other options.

The provision of income generating activities and skills training is often not based on a market survey or evidence based information (demand driven). Centers are unable to tell how many are able to support themselves from their new skills.

There is little follow up to assess the progress and situation of reporters.

## **Recommendations and Practical Steps**

Under estimation of the numbers of participants is an endemic problem within previous DDR processes.

Lactating and pregnant women, and children under the age of 18, need to be separated as quickly as possible from the rest of the LRA group and taken to reception centers in Uganda.

Adult males and females will most likely undergo demobilization in Sudan. The stay should be for at least one month and include access to healthcare and specialized care, psychosocial counseling, civic education, conflict management, human rights training, cash management, and detailed information on how to access further training and/or livelihoods skills.

All returnees need to be followed up to ensure that they have access to reintegration programs, and to ensure that they get extra assistance if needed.

The establishment of a central database with information on who has participated and what kind of benefits or other assistance they have received. This will help to avoid duplication.

Communication needs to be clear and information readily available. All returnees must know where to turn in case they experience problems.

If the resettlement package to IDPs actually corresponds to the Amnesty package it will be important to let people know this to prevent resentment or feelings of unequal treatment.

Access to formal education must be a priority. Some returnees and community members will require accelerated learning programs to be able to catch up.

Skills training and income generating activities must be based on market surveys (they need to be demand-driven as opposed to supply-driven).

All programs need to provide access to childcare or early childhood development centers to enable women's participation.

Provide access to specialized medical care, psychosocial counseling and mental health care.

Traditional ceremonies of forgiveness and reconciliation are important to help communities accept returnees and to help returnees to deal with their experiences.

# Introduction

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The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) guidelines stress the importance of reducing the level of arms as a crucial precondition for peace. They also emphasize that disarmament alone is not enough for a positive peace, but needs to be followed by demobilization and reintegration: “where disarmament ends, demobilization must begin and must eventually lead to reintegration, if successful peace and development is to be secured in countries emerging from conflict (UNDPKO). However, demobilization and reintegration is not all that is needed for long-term peace. Conflict-affected countries most often lack infrastructure and functioning institutions which are required for long term recovery. Post-conflict employment rates are often abysmal, and access to credit and income generating activities difficult.

The conflict in Northern Uganda has been going on for 21 years. The Juba Peace Talks has recorded significant progress and hope for a negotiated solution is eminent (as of April 2008). Yet the signing of the peace agreement is not the end but rather the beginning of rebuilding what has been lost. At the height of the conflict over 1.5 million people were living in camps for internally displaced people (IDPs). As the security situation has gradually improved, people have been able to move into satellite camps closer to their farm land or they have settled on their original land; this seems to be the case for IDPs in Lango sub-region, but in Acholiland many are still in the camps. Some estimated 3000 LRA members are still in the bush and are expected to return home when a final peace agreement is signed. There are thousands of unregistered returnees from the bush already living in the North who need assistance. And there are all the displaced or formerly displaced people living in the North who have suffered due to the conflict and who will eventually be living in the same communities as the former LRA members.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs tend to focus primarily on ex-combatants, and even more so on male combatants rather than the women and children who also participate in conflict. Lessons learned from previous DDR processes show this to be a grave mistake. DDR programs are not capable of solving all the problems affecting countries coming out of conflict, but the programs which are set in motion can be designed in such a manner that they do not create resentment and stigma between ex-combatants and community members. This research provides lessons learned from previous DDR processes in Africa and Uganda which hopefully will guide the government and its implement partners in a successful DDR exercise.

## Research Methodology

The research was undertaken in February and March of 2008 for Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda, a coalition of over 70 local and international civil society organizations working towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern Uganda. The research was commissioned to act as a contribution to the discussions and agreements on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

The research builds on both a desk review and interviews with stakeholders in Gulu, Kitgum, Pader and Kampala. During the visits to Northern Uganda, the consultant visited 6 different reception centers, and spoke to local government officials in Kitgum and Pader. The interviews in Kampala included meetings with the Amnesty Commission, the World Bank, the Ministry for Relief and Disaster Preparedness and Refugees, and representatives from Western Uganda and the West Nile area.

The sections on Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Liberia are based on a desk review. The section on Uganda is a mix of both desk review and interviews.

## **Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Brief Overview**

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is a governmental process that seeks to contribute to peace building by providing an opportunity for former combatants to move from armed conflict to civilian life (UNDPKO 1999; WorldBank 2002; Farr 2003; Schroeder 2005). *Disarmament* is the process of collecting small arms and light and heavy weapons; it frequently entails the assembly and cantonment of combatants. *Demobilization* refers to the process where parties to a conflict disband and combatants transfer to civilian life. During this time ex-combatants usually receive assistance to meet basic needs, spend some time at designated encampment locations and are transported to their home communities (Anderlini and Conaway 2004; UNIFEM 2004). Official processes of disarmament and demobilization have relatively well established parameters and are short-term. *Reintegration* is a long term process which to date is poorly conceptualized and whose real parameters are still undefined. Put simply, reintegration helps ex-fighters and their family's transition to civilian life and become economically, socially and politically reintegrated into society. During the initial phases of reintegration, some ex-fighters may receive cash or in-kind resettlement packages, skills training, education, and credit assistance.

Organization and funding of DDR processes varies from country to country depending on the capacity and financial ability of a country to undertake the process. Funding is negotiated between governments and the aid community, with the majority of funding coming from the World Bank, European Union, International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations. The World Bank is the main channel for donor funding of DDR in Sub-Saharan Africa, and is currently the main force behind the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa. This is a program targeting 450,000 ex-combatants in seven countries: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda (MDRP 2003).

The actual implementation of DDR is generally done in cooperation among the government, UN agencies and major donors. For example, in Sierra Leone and Liberia DDR was undertaken with the help of UN peacekeeping missions (CAI 1997; Ball and Nenon 2004), whereas in Angola and Eritrea demobilization was run solely by the government with outside help limited to the reintegration phase (Klingebliel et al. 1995; Schroeder 2005).

# Major Findings

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## DDR in Mozambique

In 1992, after 16 years of civil war, the governing party of Mozambique, Frelimo (Frente Libertacao de Mocambique) and the main opposition movement Renamo (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana) signed a peace agreement. The Rome Agreement, signed on October 4, 1992, mandated the United Nations to oversee a twelve month process involving the monitoring of the ceasefire, cantonment of troops and their demobilization, and also the reintegration of ex-soldiers to society. The DDR process was considered to be a success; however, there were many problematic areas.

### Disarmament and Demobilization

The DDR process involved 90,000 soldiers: 63,000 from Frelimo and 30,000 from the opposition. Disagreement between Frelimo and Renamo meant that the actual demobilization process started a year later than originally planned (USAID).

Delays in demobilization meant that soldiers spent several months in cantonment camps (according to McKay some spent up to 3 years in camps), this, together with a lack of information to the soldiers, eventually lead to rioting in some of the camps (Clark). Women experienced serious difficulty accessing DDR services. Some women, especially those with children, left the camps due to the inability to support their children and insecurity in camps (McKay). Both Renamo and Frelimo denied having child soldiers, thus there was no official DDR for children (Barth).

There are estimates that half a million to six million weapons were imported during the 16-year civil war. In December of 1995, 3 years after signing the peace agreement, only a small percentage of these weapons had been collected. The weapons that were handed in during disarmament were often very old, and both sides established illegal weapons caches (Alden). A large proportion of the 190,000 weapons that were collected and not immediately destroyed re-circulated both locally and regionally (Dzinesa).

### Reinsertion and Reintegration

Ex-soldiers received monthly payments ranging from MT75,000 to MT1,270,080 (USD75-130) depending on rank. This payment lasted for 2 years and is greatly attributed as an important factor to the establishment of security (Alden). While cash transfers are still seen as controversial by concerned governments and donors, it seems that most of the cash delivered in Mozambique was used as intended for food, clothes, healthcare, etc. Some parts of the transfers were used on alcohol, though not in an antisocial manner, rather as a way to help reintegration as the alcohol was used as gifts for community leaders and elders (Willibad).

Pensions were only made available for ex-soldiers who were 18 years or older when they joined the armed forces. This excluded many of the Renamo soldiers who were younger when they entered, some forced and some voluntarily (Barth).

Ex-soldiers also received a resettlement kit composed of a hoe, a bucket, and seeds (Alden). However, only 25 percent of former soldiers were in agriculture or related areas before the war, while most, 44 percent, were students (Barth).

Lack of a central database meant that some ex-soldiers received benefits several times whereas some did not benefit at all (Baden, USAID).

Only one out of six ex-combatants received any form of training. There was an overall lack of knowledge of the beneficiaries, their back ground and educational level, resulting in training that

was not appropriate. Ignorance and the absence of a market survey meant that few were able to use their training in a meaningful manner. For example, people were trained as electricians but returned to areas without electricity (Alden, Barth). Initially there was no training at all for women. The few women who eventually participated were offered gendered skills such as tailoring and secretarial skills. Lack of childcare meant that many women were unable to participate (Barth).

Most programs of either income-generating activities or skill training were focused in urban or semi urban locations, meaning that the cost of transport could be up to ½ of the monthly pension payments (Alden).

The lack of knowledge regarding the background of many of the ex-soldiers led to great dissatisfaction among certain groups of soldiers who had high levels of education and professional skills. To them the resettlement kits of basic agricultural tools were seen as an insult. Some of these disgruntled ex-soldiers became involved in criminal gangs across Mozambique, involved in illicit arms-trading, contract assassinations, money laundering and drug trafficking (Alden, Dzinesa).

### **Ownership of the process**

There was an overall lack of communication and cooperation between the government, Renamo and international donors. Mistrust between the donor community and their Mozambican counterparts led to a situation where decisionmaking and implementation was kept with donors and selected international NGOs (Alden).

### **Lessons Learned**

Excluding women and children is a grave mistake which leads to human rights violations.

Combatants should spend as little time as possible in assembly areas, though enough time to provide for meaningful demobilization.

Both parties must be given strong incentives and show political will during disarmament to ensure that all weapons are collected.

The collection of weapons should not only focus on the combatants but also involve communities as they might have large number of weapons and knowledge of weapon caches.

Women and children need special attention and focused programs to be able to participate in a meaningful way. They have different needs and should not be considered as one group.

A central database needs to be established to avoid duplication.

Cash transfers over a long period of time can be a very effective way to help ex-soldiers get established in a new area or returning to their old communities.

Skills training needs to be based on market surveys to be able to offer skills which are marketable, and should take earlier education and skills into consideration.

Lack of communication among donors, government and local communities can lead to a process which lacks local ownership. This has implications for the long-term sustainability of the process.

## **DDR in Sierra Leone**

DDR in Sierra Leone can be divided into 3 phases. The first phase started in September 1998 and ended in December of the same year due to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attack on Freetown. The second phase came after the signing of the Lome Peace Accord in July 1999, but was again interrupted due to fighting. The third and final phase came after the signing of the Abuja Peace Accord in November of 2000. This time DDR was undertaken with the help of United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and lasted from May 2001 to January 2002 (Richards). The initial estimate of combatants was 45,000, with the total number of combatants from the 3 phases ending up to over 72,000. 84 percent of the demobilized soldiers were men, 6.5 percent women and 9.4 percent children (Mazurana and Carlson).

The Lome Peace Accord was the first such document to give child combatants explicit and particular attention in DDR. A total number of 6,904 children participated (Williamson and Cripe).

### **Disarmament and Demobilization**

In the first phase, adults were eligible for entry in the DDR program by presenting a modern weapon. In both phase one and two “wives” and dependents were not able to participate. There are accounts of commanders collecting guns, both from women and men (and boys and girls), and then redistributing them to dependants to allow them to take part in the process (Richards). The modern weapon criterion was later changed as officials realized that many combatants were excluded: following this, groups were allowed to enter together, that is, one weapon for several persons. However, in many instances commanders were in charge of identifying the rank and responsibility of soldiers. This further undermined the situation for women as many were either registered as dependants to men who were keeping them by force, or they were denied access as commanders did not recognize them as full participants (Richards, Mazurana and Carlson).

Many women spontaneously demobilized; that is, at the end of the conflict they went home without participating in the official DDR program. Returning home with a weapon could have created suspicion among the receiving community, thus most often they arrived without a weapon. As this barred them from receiving any help, some left home again in search of a weapon, or they just remained without access to any assistance (Women's Commission). There are no exact numbers as to how many women and girls were involved in fighting forces in Sierra Leone: estimates range between 10 and 30 percent. The estimated number of children who were in fighting forces is roughly 48,000. The low participation in the DDR program can be explained by the entry process (lack of a weapon) and also fear of reprisal from opposing forces at the centers, fear of sexual violence, stigmatization, prosecution, and lack of information (Denov, Mazurana and Carlson).

The average stay at encampment sites was 72 hours (Brooks). Pre-discharge orientation was cut short, with little attention paid to psycho-social needs, civic education, conflict management and human rights training. This also severely hampered the chances of breaking the command structure. Furthermore, during phase I and II, commanders were in charge of organizing the camps and maintaining security (Ball and Nenon). Ex-combatants received a Transitional Safety Net Allowance (TSA) of USD300 in two installments, the first at the end of the disarmament period, the second three months later. The actual amount received varied from USD90-150 (Stavrou et al, Women's Commission). The situation for women at the encampment sites was inadequate with lack of access to medical care, clothing, and feminine hygiene products (Mazurana and Carlson).

Children were sent to Interim Care Centers or directly to their families. Lack of clear information

made many children feel betrayed as they had high expectations of receiving the TSA, immediate enrollment in formal education, vocational training, or access to employment (Brooks).

### **Reintegration**

The reintegration period in Sierra Leone experienced several problems- partly as a result of a lack of funding (Ginifer). Most of the training involved courses that were scheduled to last up to six months: however, cutbacks were common, and in some places training only lasted for three months (Women's Commission). Most trainees received a small stipend during the training and a relevant toolkit at the end (Stavrou et al, Women's Commission). In some cases women and girl mothers were discouraged from entering into education, and instead urged to attend skills training as this was supposedly more appropriate for them to make sure they could support their children (Mazurana and Carlson). A major complaint was that six months (and then later three months) is not enough time to learn competitive skills. Lack of start up capital and business skills further hindered the ability to use the new skills, as did the lack of assessment of the labor market resulting in some training which did not meet the need of the communities where people were settling. Some ex-combatants, frustrated with their inability to earn an income, sold their tool kits and went to the diamond fields. Many of the implementing partners did not have adequate capacity or experience in providing the training they were supposed to offer (Ball and Nenon). There are allegations of implementing partners delivering substandard materials and tools, and only part of promised packages such as allowances or Food for Work (Richards).

Community committees played an important role helping children with family identification; the committees were also involved in monitoring the situation with the children once they had returned to their families (Williamson and Cripe).

High turnover of military personnel associated with UNAMSIL and ECOMOG meant that UNICEF and child-focused NGOs constantly had to retrain and renegotiate with the teams to ensure the safety and interest of children (Williamson and Cripe).

Women who were unable to participate in DDR programs sometimes ended up in low-status marriages, often as a second wife in a rural area, or some turned to commercial sex work in the cities to be able to support themselves (Richards).

It was often difficult for ex-combatants to get access to the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) staff and offices, as they were not present in hard to reach locations and communication. This led to uncertainties regarding when and where to access training, and when to get the TSAs.

### **Ownership of the process**

There are disagreements regarding whether the government of Sierra Leone controlled the DDR process or not. There were strong incentives and high level commitments within the government to see that the DDR process was successfully implemented and reflected Sierra Leone's priorities and vision. Yet there were tensions between the government and donors, stemming from limited financial capacity from the government, and donors who did not fully support the view of the government. Lack of government financial contribution meant that implementation was often left to international partners who promoted their own models (Ball and Nenon).

### **Lessons Learned**

Criteria for entry to DDR process needs to be set in such a way that women and children are not excluded.

Encampment sites need to take women's needs and concern into consideration.

Information regarding the DDR process needs to be clear and widely available to avoid disappointments and ensure full participation.

Women should always receive benefits independently and not be tied to a male as this can prevent them from leaving forced and unwanted relationships.

The time spent at encampment sites need to be long enough to break the chain of command, and provide meaningful psychosocial support and discharge information.

Skills training needs to be based on a clear market assessment to ensure that skills are in fact in demand.

Implementation partners need to be properly screened to ensure that they are in fact capable of providing what they promise.

Skills training needs to be long enough for participants to gain competitive and marketable skills

Training should offer access to business skills and start-up capital.

Communities should be involved from the beginning to foster community ownership and understanding of the DDR process.

International partners need to ensure that institutional knowledge does not disappear due to rapid turnover, and should work closely with government officials to ensure a process which builds local capacity and long-term sustainability.

## **DDR in Liberia**

Liberia has experienced two separate DDR processes where 9 different groups have been disarmed within a period of 8 years. The first DDR process followed the signing of a peace agreement in Abuja, Nigeria, in August of 1996. General elections were held in July 1997 and Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front, won with an overwhelming majority. Within 2 years after the elections civil war broke out again. One highly simplified analysis of the reason for the resurgence of conflict is partly due to the government's refusal to implement a meaningful reintegration process, together with a failure to solve issues still lingering from the previous conflict (Bruthus).

The second DDR process came from the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, Ghana in August of 2003. This agreement stipulated, among other things, the implementation of DDR for an estimated 38,000 ex-combatants from the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), Liberia United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) Movement for Democracy (MODEL) and other smaller paramilitary groups.

### **Disarmament and Demobilization**

In the first attempt, in 1996 and 1997, 6 rebel groups were to participate in a DDR program, involving roughly 60,000 ex-combatants (Olonisakin and Alao). However reintegration was incomplete and plagued with severe lack of funding. The two main organizers of the process, the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) and the United Nations Mission to Liberia (UNMIL) scrambled to finish the process in time for elections in July. This meant that sound strategies, designs and programming for demobilization and reintegration were non-existent. For instance, instead of allowing for ex-combatants to spend 2-4 months at encampment sites, the maximum time allotted was 12 hours. There was no transportation available, leading to a situation where most ex-fighters remained under the same command and control environment as during the conflict (CAII). There was also no education, training or rehabilitation. The only available reintegration program was a three-month transition program (road clearing and bridge mending) which was offered to a small number of ex-combatants (Olonisakin and Alao). There are estimates that up to 21,000 children participated in the conflict but only 4000 participated in DDR. Hardly any of the 5000 girls participated. When hostilities resumed it was possible to quickly re-mobilize the children as many were still under control of their commanders (Amnesty International).

The second DDR process started in December of 2003. The initial estimate of 38,000 ex-fighters proved to be a gross under-estimation as the final tally was 103,019 out of which roughly 11,000 were children and 22,456 women (NCDDRR). Using lessons from DDR in Sierra Leone, where many women and children were unable to participate, the entry criteria for women and children this time was much more open. Despite this, the disarmament and demobilization got off to a bad start as inadequate preparation, such as lack of food and water, and unrealistic expectations on the side of the combatants, led to rioting (Nichols). 29,794 weapons were collected, representing roughly 60 percent of all weapons believed to have been used (NCDDRR, Bruthus). This time ex-combatants stayed at the cantonment sites for up to 5 days. During their stay they went through a medical screening, received ID cards, identified reintegration preferences, and received a package of non-food items (mat to sleep on, a bucket, clothing, and toiletry items). The stay also included pre-discharge orientation, including career counseling, health awareness, civic education, and peace-building and reconciliation. In addition to this women were offered reproductive health care, and sexual and gender based violence counseling. Men and women were housed in separate quarters whereas children were taken to interim care centers to be reunited with family. Upon leaving each ex-combatant received a one month supply of food and the first of two Transitional Safety Net Allowances (TSA) of USD150. The second installment

was to be received 3 months later (Nichols). Although the time spent at encampment sites were considerably longer this time as compared with the first DDR, it is still believed that it was not sufficient as it often failed to break the chain of command structure (Kalilu).

There were massive abuses of the program as some ex-combatants demobilized twice in order to get access to the resettlement kit and the TSA. A weak screening process, coupled with insufficiently trained staff, led to an unknown level of civilian participation (Nichols). Arms were brought in from Sierra Leone and Guinea and sold to civilians to gain access to DDR (Olonisakin and Alao, Kalilu). Some ex-combatants were also believed to have held on to their weapons in hopes of participating in the DDR process in Cote d'Ivoire as the TSA there was considerably higher (USD600-900) (Kalilu).

### **Reintegration**

Most of the available funds were used for the Disarmament and Demobilization processes, leaving a funding shortage for the reintegration aspect. Though different skills training and educational options were provided, there was a lack of opportunity to actually use the skills (Kalilu). Major constraints in the training included inadequate tools, learning and working material (JIU). 65 percent of those who completed training were unable to find work within the area of their new skill set (Fayemi). However, this should be understood in the context of 85 percent unemployment in the formal sector (UNDP).

There was little to no follow-up on the progress of ex-combatants: for example little was done regarding youth who received the first TSA installment then left for Guinea to participate in the next conflict (Olonisakin and Alao).

Reintegration took place with little consultation and involvement from local communities (UNIFEM). One complaint was that local ideas were not heard and that most of the implementation was done by INGOs instead of local groups (Olonisakin and Alao). There were also reports of massive corruption within local NGOs, as NGOs were applying for funding to participate in reintegration programs without the capacity to fully implement the plans presented (Kalilu).

Referral and counseling offices were supposed to help ex-combatants with sensitization, information and identification of reintegration programs. The offices were to be established in strategic locations across the country, though two years after the start of DDR the only operational office was still in Monrovia, the capital (Kalilu).

Since there was no gender advisor to the program, the policy for women was linked to that of child soldiers with therefore little consideration for women's unique needs and requirements (UNIFEM).

### **Ownership of the process**

A major problem for the DDR process was that it was too rushed and lacked clear guidance in which policies should guide the process. There was also a lack of coordination between UN officials, the Joint Implementation Unit (JIU), the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) and NGOs (Kalilu).

### **Lessons Learned**

The encampment period must be long enough to break the chain of command. 5 days is not enough to break drug habits, receive meaningful psychosocial support, and

experience a change in lifestyle.

There needs to be consistency and collaboration in regions (such as West Africa) where there are multiple DDR processes, especially in regard to any cash payments and benefits.

The expertise of UNDPKO, UNICEF and UNIFEM should be incorporated into the DDR process at the planning stage, not when the process is already ongoing.

Use already developed guidelines as tools for implementing DDR, allowing for changes due to country specific requirements.

Reintegration is a long-term process and requires the input of the local communities who will ultimately be responsible for the success or failure of reintegration.

Women are repeatedly overlooked in DDR processes. A gender advisor and representatives from women's groups should be part of the planning from the very beginning, preferably starting at the peace negotiations stage

Skills training needs to reflect the realities in the communities of re-settlement, preferably identified through viable market-based assessments.

Coordination and information sharing between stakeholders and partners is an endemic problem which needs to be addressed.

# Uganda

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Uganda has experienced several DDR processes since 1986. Some have been small and focused primarily on disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants whereas others have also included reintegration aspects. The agreements between the government of Uganda and various rebel groups have most often depended on the negotiations skills of the rebel groups and are thus quite varied in their scope. For example, the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) was unable to negotiate a resettlement package, whereas the Uganda National Rescue Front II negotiated an agreement which provided a 4.2 billion Ug shillings package to be distributed amongst the ex-combatants. Where agreements have been made there has been very little coordination with local communities. According to interviews with government officials from the West Nile area, many communities still feel a lot of resentment and frustration due to resettlement packages being awarded to ex-combatants only. It is a mix of feeling left out, as non-combatants needs for reintegration and resettlement are often very similar to ex-combatants, and feeling that the perpetrators of atrocities are being rewarded (Refugee Law Project and key informant interviews).

The main rebel groups who have gone through the Amnesty process include the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) with 12,201 reporters, West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) with 4108 reporters, Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II) with 3113 reporters, and Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) with 1829 reporters (Amnesty Commission). Of these groups only the LRA and ADF are still active, though negotiations with the government are ongoing with both groups. However, many of those who have returned from the bush have not gone thorough the Amnesty Commission and are therefore not part of these numbers. There are estimates that only one third of eligible youth in the North of Uganda have reported to the Amnesty Commission, leaving large numbers unaccounted for and who may still come forward to request Amnesty and a reintegration package (SWAY November 2007).

## **Amnesty Commission**

The Amnesty Commission was established in 2000 to facilitate the implementation of the Amnesty Act, which was passed in January of 2000 (an Act of parliament). The aim of the Amnesty Act is to provide blanket amnesty to all Ugandans who have participated in armed rebellion against the Government of Uganda since 1986. There have been 27 different rebel groups who have taken advantage of the Amnesty Act since its initiation (Amnesty Commission).

### Specific Objectives of the Amnesty Commission

- Promote the Amnesty Act
- Sensitize the public about the Amnesty Law
- Promote dialogue and reconciliation in war affected areas
- Carry out demobilization and disarmament of reporters
- Grant Amnesty to reporters
- Reintegrate and resettle reporters in their communities
- Monitor and evaluate Commission activities

While the objectives for the Amnesty Commission are broad and include many of the elements in DDR, the main focus thus far has been on the granting of Amnesty certificates and the provision of reinsertion packages. The Amnesty certificate provides proof that the person has received amnesty. The reinsertion packages consist of physical items to help with resettling and a cash transfer of 263,000 Ugandan Shillings (USD155).

Lack of funding has severely hampered the Amnesty Commission's ability to fully carry out its stated objectives. For example, follow-up of reporters is supposed to last for two years but due to lack of manpower that has not been working well at all (interview with Amnesty Commission official). There is still a lack of understanding of the Amnesty Act among potential reporters who

qualifies, and where to go (SWAY Research brief Reintegration). Reintegration and resettlement is mostly done through implementing partners who often get funding from other institutions rather than the Amnesty Commission.

Both the LRA and the ADF operate on an international basis with people and arms moving illegally into Sudan and DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo). There has been some cooperation with DRC (setting up of office in DRC), trying to get Ugandan combatants in DRC to go back to Uganda, and also visits to Sudan (office to be established in the near future). The Amnesty Commission is working together with the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) and has had useful exchanges of information and lessons learned. Despite this there seems to be little coordination between countries as each nation focuses primarily on national issues and international problems are rarely followed up (interview with Amnesty Commission official).

The Amnesty Commission has previously experienced difficulties accessing the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) funding for ex-combatants. Funding for 110 projects in the West Nile area were granted in early 2008, including piggyery, goat rearing, cattle restocking, metal fabrication and more. It is still too early to tell how successful these projects are.

There are great hopes for the Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP). Under the PRDP, the Amnesty Commission will run 5 offices in the districts which will provide information, counseling and referrals to reporters to enable them to access PRDP funding. This will be done with support from the trust fund established by the World Bank and supported by several international donors.

Some of the key challenges faced by the Amnesty Commission include:

- Inadequate funding

- Will the offices in the district be able to give referrals that are meaningful?

- Lack of market survey to know what types of skills are in demand

- Need to conduct more sensitization and dialogue to prepare communities to receive reporters

- Difficult to make people in the communities feel that they are part of the process

- Does the Commission have the required capacity to carry out its mandate?

Despite these issues, the Amnesty Commission is positive that they will be able to resolve them in an appropriate manner as they otherwise feel well prepared for the arrival of the remaining LRA members.

## **Reception centers**

Six different reception centers were visited for this consultancy during a five-day period, traveling between Gulu, Kitgum and Pader. The following information relies on data gathered during those visits, or research documents.

There are several reception centers which cater mainly for women and children. Reporters are brought to the centers by the UPDF, Amnesty Commission, local, religious, and traditional leaders, or they find their own way. Most reporters stay for a period of 2-6 weeks with some staying longer depending on their needs. There are variations between the centers but all provide medical care, counseling, family-tracing, help with accessing a Amnesty certificate, start-up kits (usually basic household items and some food- none of the centers visited currently provides cash), different types of income-generating activities, and some access to formal education or vocational skills training. Some centers have provided cash as start-up capital for income

generating activities (IGA). There are currently 5 centers in Pader, Gulu, Kitgum and Lira which are waiting for returnees, and an additional 4 centers which are on standby in case the need for them arises.

Most of the personnel at the centers visited in carrying out this assessment (Feb 2008) agreed that the shorter the stay at the centers the better: two weeks seems to be the preferred length though some suggest one month. Some of the children who stay longer have a hard time going back to their communities as they form bonds with the centers, and return to a situation where they often lack the amenities that can be found at the centers. As one center worker put it “the kids become nostalgic as they talk about the nice time in the centers.” The centers provide 3 meals a day, have electricity and water when they return to the communities they might eat once or twice a day, and have no electricity or access to running water.

Most centers seem to have agreements with hospitals and clinics where they can take the reporters. One of the main reasons for prolonged stays is to take care of serious medical situations and to help women through pregnancy. There are estimates that 3 percent of female returnees and 9 percent of male returnees have serious injuries which require the attention of a surgeon (SWAY Reintegration Brief). Several of the centers said it was too difficult to follow up on medical issues once the reporters were back in the community.

There are various levels of counseling, with some centers lacking personnel for psycho-social counseling.

The income generating activities varied in form and set up. Some centers worked mainly with individuals, others preferred to work with groups. Examples of income generating activities (IGA) include the starting of small businesses, brick-making, bakeries, catering, bicycle repair, hairdressing, knitting, poultry breeding, goat and pig rearing, and tailoring. None of the personnel at the centers were able to give the percentage of IGAs that were able to provide a viable income for those practicing them. Nor did any of the centers base their choice of skills training on a market survey or other evidence based information showing the feasibility of the skills. In some cases the type of IGA reflects the desires of the individual or group starting it; in others it is dependent on access to trainers and funding. The training generally lasts for 3-6 months. Several of the reception centers provide vocational training, either at schools run by the centers or they pay tuition at an institution. Typical vocations are: carpentry and joinery, metal work, tailoring, mechanics, construction, catering, agriculture, and computer training. When possible skills training and vocational education is accompanied by start-up capital and/or toolkits and access to training in business skills, however it was not clear how often that happens. Few of the reception centers could provide statistics of the success rate of their training. Several centers also provide access to formal education though lack of funding sometimes made it difficult to follow through and keep the support going for a longer period of time. Only one center out of the six that were visited has accelerated learning. Two of the centers have special training for child mothers where the child is allowed to be with its mother during the training, or childcare is provided.

All the centers have some sort of follow up system for the reporters once they return to their communities. It seems as the most effective ones are those systems which build capacity in the communities of return instead of relying on personnel from the center itself. Few of the centers could say how many of their reporters are still in school, are using the skills they learnt to earn an income, or if they are experiencing problems at home or not.

A major issue is that few of the centers focus on adult males. According to one interview with a worker at a center which provides services for adult males, many go directly home instead of staying at a center and a large number join the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF). For some, UPDF is a good alternative as they feel they have no other skills, it provides a steady

income and enables them to support their families. However, several of the key informants said; if there were alternatives, such as skills training, access to business training and start-up funds, most would chose these options instead of the UPDF.

An issue of concern is the fact that personnel at three of the six centers said that women who had been forced to stay with commanders and fighters in the bush as “wives” often want to remain with their captor “husbands”, especially if they had children. This is contrary to other research findings done in the North, where it has been found that the majority of formerly captive women and girls seek to avoid relationships with former captors (Carlson et al. under review). For those who do stay in these relationships it might be that they see no other option, and that could be a potential failure of reintegration. If these women and girls are given the opportunity to become financially independent it is unlikely that they will continue with their previous relationships.

Research by Susan McKay highlights the fate of formerly abducted young mothers, a group which has been termed ‘the most’ vulnerable of all returnees. The research shows that having a child may be a key factor hindering resettlement and reintegration (McKay et al 2006). There is little information on the fate of these children. What is known from Northern Uganda is that these children are often stigmatized, abused or outright rejected by their extended families and communities. In cases where the mother remarries or lives with a man other than the father of the child, the child may be abused and food and medicine withheld (Carlson et al. under review).

It was clear from the interviews that most respondents believed that communication between the different centers should improve, both to avoid duplication but also to learn from the experience of others. Several wanted better support and capacity building for the district structure which coordinates programs to be able to avoid duplication of work, and to help with referrals. There are high hopes that the contingency plan developed by UNICEF and Save the Children for the remaining LRA reporters will build better channels of communication. The contingency plan includes a data base which will be able to track all reporters who pass through a center. In one interview the respondent voiced concern that it was sometimes difficult to get information from other centers and he felt there was “rivaling NGO politics” between the centers.

Most respondents believe that communication and interaction with communities can improve. Families should be involved from the beginning.

In one interview the respondent stressed the importance of dialogue and discussion so as to be able to start healthy communication with community members so they feel they are part of the process. “Sensitization is a one way dialogue we need to talk to people and hear what they have to say as well (key informant in Gulu).” Community elders and traditional leaders should be part of the process of talking to reporters. This will help in two directions; reporters will feel they are part of the community, and community leaders will feel they have an input in the reintegration process.

Some of the centers only focus on the reporters while others are starting to broaden their assistance to vulnerable children and youth in the communities. Many of the non-abducted youth and children have suffered due to the conflict as well, and have similar problems to deal with. A broader focus will help communities accept the assistance given by the reception centers if it is delivered on a needs basis and not solely based on abduction status.

### **Existing Programs and Plans**

The Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) has been one of the main venues for assistance to returnees, displaced and vulnerable people. This report does not pretend to give a full description of the successes or failures of NUSAF but rather provides a brief insight to some of the issues which were encountered during the short research period, and which deal with the

program as a whole, not specifically issues for returnees. Several respondents were able to provide information on how NUSAF has been extremely helpful in agricultural related projects, especially within cattle restocking. However, there were many concerns which were repeatedly mentioned. A major issue while talking to government officials in Pader, Gulu and Kitgum is that local officials feel they have been sidelined in the implementation of NUSAF. First of all, there has been a lack of communication about what NUSAF is and what can be expected. They believe NUSAF could have been more effective if funds had been coordinated through local development offices. For example, poor support and supervision to communities receiving funds has led to the construction of buildings which were not safe. There was a lack of transparency in how funds were distributed and accounted for, and several people mentioned mismanagement of funds, both on community levels and higher up within the program. Several of the respondents spoke of how NUSAF officials created projects which benefited themselves and their families instead of needy people in the communities. Another major complaint was the lack of information on who can apply, where and how. Many believe that the most vulnerable groups were left out as there was too much bureaucracy involved in applying for funds, and not enough support and help in the application process. Other concerns involved delays in accessing funds.

The Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) is a 3 year plan launched by the government of Uganda in September of 2007. The plan will focus on all districts in Northern Uganda, including areas in the North-East and North-West. The strategic objectives are:

1. Consolidation of state authority
2. Rebuilding and empowering communities
3. Revitalization of the economy
4. Peace building and reconciliation

It is still too early to say if the PRDP will be successful or not. Most of the NGOs and government officials interviewed during this consultancy were unsure about the PRDP. Everyone had heard of the program but very few knew about specifics. According to one respondent in Gulu “We have heard about this magic bullet but no one tells us how it will be done.” The main concerns revolve around lack of capacity to execute the program, fear of mismanagement, too little input by communities, lack of information and fear that it will be “business as usual” many promises but little output.

However, the PRDP is a great opportunity to create change in the North. In regard to strategic objective 4 (Peace building and reconciliation), and specifically the section on Demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, it seems the plan is mostly repeating what has already been done, i.e. distribution of resettlement packages and a cash transfer to reporters. It seems the local districts and private organizations, rather than the Amnesty Commission, will take a bigger role in reintegration efforts. It is unclear if the capacity is there to handle this. Creating a situation where the reintegration programs for reporters are the same as for other vulnerable people in the communities would be a very positive step forward, and would help minimize resentment and stigmatization against reporters.

### **What kind of projects can support successful reintegration?**

The most important aspect for successful reintegration projects is to not target according to abduction status but to include all vulnerable people in the communities. The Amnesty package is seen by many as a reward for having committed atrocities; continued assistance based purely on abduction status will only serve to increase stigmatization and resentment. Recent research from Northern Uganda shows that the overwhelming majority of youth in the North have been adversely affected by the conflict, and are in need of assistance whether or not they have been abducted (Annan et al 2006, Annan et al 2007.).

There needs to be a wide range of projects supporting livelihoods. The overwhelming majority of people in the North are small-scale farmers. As internally displaced people are moving out of the camps, either closer to their homesteads or back to their original villages, increased access to farm land is becoming a reality. Support for agricultural services such as tools, seeds and training will be important, as will the restocking of animals and related access to community-based veterinary services. Most people lack access to oxen to prepare their land and use only a hoe and panga. This means they can only farm a small piece of land even if they have access to more. Programs focusing on cattle restocking are therefore very important. Programs which provide access to draft animals, such as oxen, or tractors could also be effective. One tractor can potentially plough 8 acres of land in a day, at a cost of 70,000 shillings (USD40) per acre. Access to information on modern farming practices such as; improved seed varieties, improved agronomic practices (proper plant spacing, inter-cropping, agro-forestry), market-driven decision making on what crops to grow, soil fertility management (fertilization, green manures, crop rotation), diversification of crops grown, and improved storage facilities will also prove valuable.

Before starting any kind of vocational education and skills training there needs to be a market survey conducted to get evidence-based understanding of what kinds of skills and vocations can be supported in the communities to provide sustainable livelihood options. Once such options have been established, they need to be provided in tandem with business skills and start-up capital. All training must provide access to childcare so that women and girls with children are able to participate as well. Training should also be long enough to provide skills that are competitive and practically useful, not just an introduction or basics. Tailoring has been one of the most popular skills to teach women though it is very questionable how useful tailoring is and to what extent it can provide an income.

Access to formal education will be an important aspect which requires long-term commitments. Many of the youth coming back will have missed several years of schooling and will require accelerated learning programs to be able to catch up. However, the same will be true for many of the youth in IDP communities. Women and girls are less likely than men and boys to continue to secondary school. Only 33 percent of women and girls complete 7<sup>th</sup> grade and 45 percent drop out of primary school (Mazurana et al 2007). While 43 percent of females are illiterate, women and girls with children are even less likely to have access to education due to their inability or unwillingness to attend school (Mazurana et al 2007). Access to education for this group can be made possible through the establishment of day care or early childhood development centers, community support, and financial support. While females returning from the bush with children are at a clear disadvantage, there are also young mothers who have never been abducted who are in the same position. Increasing support for alternative basic education structures would be another important step to fulfilling this need, as well as advocating with the government to provide more teachers and resources to alternative basic education throughout the North.

Some of the returnees will need access to proper medical care, above what can be provided at local clinics. According to SWAY, “3 percent of females and 9 percent of male returnees report serious war injuries that prevent them from performing basic tasks such as walking and running, working in their fields, or even standing up with ease. Chest and back injuries from carrying heavy loads are most common, followed by shrapnel in the body...” (Annan et al 2007). It is also very likely that many women and girls will need access to gynecological care as many have been repeatedly raped, or given birth unattended at a young age.

Access to mental health services, above what is currently provided at the reception centers, is also a necessity.

Community reconciliation and ceremonies of forgiveness and cleansing can play an important role to help welcome back and cleanse returnees, help protect communities from evil influences

and call for help from ancestors. These rituals can be very important for both the returnees and the receiving community to facilitate reintegration. Women and girls participating in traditional ceremonies in northern Uganda describe how rituals helped relieve them of headaches, nightmares, and body-pain (Cole 2007). Two of the reception centers, in Gulu and Kitgum, mentioned how traditional ceremonies have become commercialized. There are several NGOs supporting traditional ceremonies and in some instances ceremonies have reportedly been almost imposed on communities as donors are expecting to see ceremonies performed. Ceremonies need to be worked out in collaboration with community leaders and supported, not overtaken, by donors.

### **Community Involvement and ownership of the programme**

It is important to involve the community from an early stage. There have already been several programs in the North and in many instances people have been disappointed, mostly because they have not been able to benefit, expectations have been misguided, or they believe funds have been misused.

In learning from earlier DDR processes it becomes clear that one of the weak points has been lack of community involvement. There are several ways in which communities can become active participants within the DDR process:

- Transparent and easily available and accessible information through radio announcements, newspaper articles, and community meetings.

- Community participation in the development and planning of programs supporting returnees and other vulnerable members of society.

- Community forums where people can voice concerns, fears, ideas, and have questions answered.

- Ensuring that the implementation of the PRDP successfully links its community focus with the reintegration piece of DDR.

- Programs which help returnees should be focused on needs rather than on abduction status; this will ensure a mix of participants from other vulnerable communities as well.

- Creation of youth groups and other types of support groups built around common interests which are a mix of returnees and community members to help mitigate the effects of stigmatization.

- Reception centers need to be more proactive in their interaction with communities. This can be done for example through mentoring programs which bring community members into the centers to share knowledge and cultural values.

- Communities should be supported in the implementation of community-led cleansing and reconciliation ceremonies, as well as community based justice mechanisms.

## **Recommendations and practical steps for DDR in Northern Uganda**

According to interviews with respondents at the Amnesty Commission and the World Bank it is estimated that roughly 3000 people are still with the LRA (interview with key informants, Kampala). It is difficult to know how many of those are women and children, but estimates are around 30 to 50 percent. Compared to earlier DDR processes that is a rather small and, hopefully, manageable number. There are also an unknown number of returnees who have not registered with the Amnesty Commission and who may come forward. Most previous DDR processes have underestimated the number of participants, which has created problems with funding and implementation. The number coming out of Sudan will probably not change drastically, though when the programs begin in Uganda, the Amnesty Commission and other implementing partners need to be prepared for a possible influx of participants. There is also the potential for smaller groups of LRA members in both Sudan and DRC who have not been part of the peace negotiations, and who may or may not want to come forward.

### **Policy recommendations for government and other key actors:**

Ensure the involvement of UNICEF and UNIFEM to uphold the rights of women and children.

Screen implementing partners to ensure that they are capable of providing what they promise.

Ensure transparent and effective communications to share information among donors, government and local communities.

Ensure that the DDR part of the PRDP is upheld and implemented with a community-based focus.

Disarmament should not only focus on ex-combatants but also include community disarmament.

Support market-based surveys to ensure that skills training and other activities are based on sound data.

Ensure that Universal Primary Education is available and support access to secondary school as well as alternative basic education structures in areas without adequate government schools.

Work with community-based organizations to strengthen their capacity to ensure long-term sustainability.

Ensure that capacity of local government institutions is such that they are able to work effectively to support sustainable integration

Design and implement psychosocial support programmes tailored to returnees

### **Program recommendations for implementing partners:**

Once the government of Uganda and the LRA reach a final agreement and are ready to start the DDR process it is important to move women and children out of Sudan as quickly as possible. The group will include lactating and pregnant women as well as all children under the age of 18. UNICEF and Save the Children have developed a contingency plan detailing how that will be undertaken. There are currently five centers in Pader, Gulu, Lira and Kitgum which are waiting for returnees, and an additional four centers which are on standby in case the need for them arises.

**Separate lodging should be provided for men, women and children in the transition period waiting for repatriation to Uganda or for demobilization in Sudan.**

Once the group has left Sudan they will be taken to reception centers across Northern Uganda. **The stay at the reception centers should be as short as possible, depending on needs and**

**ability to locate family.** Reception centers should be able to connect the women and children to long-term programs suitable to their needs and desires. The main goal should be to get as many as possible back into formal education. Other programs and interventions include those mentioned in the previous section.

**Disarmament needs to be accompanied by safe and well documented storage and/or destruction of weapons.** This is a small operation compared to earlier disarmament processes in Africa, and it should be possible to complete it quickly. However, lack of cooperation and trust between the two sides can complicate the situation and lead to a scenario where only a fraction of weapons are collected. As a side note, it is likely there are also weapons within communities in Northern Uganda. It is difficult to collect weapons until people feel the security situation is such they no longer need them. Possible collection schemes could include weapons for food or community/group exchange of weapons for oxen.

**Looking at experience from earlier demobilization plans, it is recommended that ex-combatants stay for a period of at least one month at encampment sites, possibly longer.** This will be a time to prepare them for civilian life and become disengaged from their structure of command. During this time they will need medical check ups and access to doctors if needed, psychosocial counseling, civic education, conflict management, human rights training, cash management, and detailed information on how to access further training and/or livelihoods skills. While some may be ready to return to their communities of origin after this there might be others who require prolonged psychosocial support and may not be ready to enter society. This might possibly be done in reception centers in Uganda, where they slowly can start the reintegration process.

**Women need to stay at separate encampment sites where they have access to the same training as mentioned above.** Women also need access to gynecological specialists, and access to sanitation and hygiene articles.

**Once ex-combatants are returned to their communities it is important that they are followed-up to ensure that they get access to training, education and also to make sure that those who need access to further psychosocial counseling receive it.**

**All reporters need to be followed up to ensure that they are reintegrating well.** If they are having problems they need to be connected to services which are able to help them. It is best if such services can be found within the community, for example help from a community leader in case there are family problems or stigmatization issues.

**The establishment of a central data base which will provide information on who has participated in training or education, and what kind of benefits they have received is critical.** This will help avoid duplication of services. This database should also be able to track and follow up on reporters.

**Clear communication channels for information are crucial for success.** This includes communication to reporters and to the communities in which they are settling. Reporters need to know what to anticipate so that they don't arrive with expectations which are unrealistic. They also need to know where to access support, how to access it and who to turn to in case they have problems. Communities need to be well informed and prepared for the arrival of reporters. According to the PRDP, IDPs will be receiving a resettlement package that is of roughly equal value as the Amnesty package. That is appropriate as it will be easier for community members to accept the assistance provided to reporters if they themselves are receiving items or cash of similar value.

**According to most respondents, programs for reintegration should focus on:**

access to proper medical care,  
formal education,  
vocational education and skills training,  
improved agricultural methods,  
community reconciliation.

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# Steering Committee

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CARE International in Uganda  
The African PACT  
Soroti District Association NGO Network (SODANN)  
Save the Children in Uganda  
Pader NGO Forum  
Jamii ya Kupatinisha (JYAK)  
Concern Worldwide  
Oxfam GB  
Uganda Child Rights NGO Network  
World Vision Uganda  
Uganda National NGO Forum  
Concerned Parents Association

# Member Organisations

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MENNONITE Central Committee - Uganda  
Foundation for Democracy and Conflict Resolution  
COU-PDR  
Save the Children in Uganda  
War Child Holland  
Oxfam GB in Uganda  
AVSI  
AMREF  
SNV - Netherlands Development Organisation  
Care International In Uganda  
Jamii ya Kupatinisha  
The Uganda National NGO Forum  
CONCERN WORLDWIDE - UGANDA  
International Rescue Committee  
Abantu for Development Uganda  
Media for Peace and Religious Tolerance Organisation (MPRTO)  
World Vision Uganda  
Uganda Child Rights NGO Network (UCRNN)  
Africa Leadership Institute  
Uganda People's Development Association (UPDA)  
Uganda Support for Children and Women Organisation  
Community Integrated Forum for Moral and Social Transformation (CIFMOST)  
Family Integrated Services for Health and Development  
Young Generation Health Club  
Acan Akwo Kwo I Lwete  
Par Peko Parent Support Group  
Apala Widows and Orphanage Centre  
Lango Environmental Development Foundation (LEDF)  
Lango Agro-Producers and Entertainers (LAPE)  
CETAWO/Hope Again International (HAI)  
Rwot Ogena Parent Support Group

Concerned Parents' Association (CPA)  
Acoke Rural Development Initiative (ARDI)  
Concerned Children and Youth Association  
Lira District Crime Prevention  
African Youth Initiative Network - Uganda Chapter  
District NFO Forum Lira  
Development Training and Research Centre  
Action for Rural Development (AFODE)  
Koboko Youth in Development (KOYID)  
Koboko United Women's Association (KUWA)  
Kuluba United Group (KUG)  
Care for the Needy (CAFON)  
ESTEEM  
The African Pact  
Associates for Community Initiative (ACI)  
Kanatemmy Foundation for Peace  
Volunteers Across Nile (VAN)  
Agoro Community Development Association  
Alice Labol Foundation  
Amia Anyima Youth Development Association  
Youth Out of Poverty and AIDS (YOPA)  
Kitgum NGO Forum  
Kitgum Integrated Initiative for Development Action (KIIDA)  
The Populace Foundation - Uganda (TPF-Uganda)  
Community Coping Support Organisation  
Fountain of Hope Ministries  
Pader NGO Forum  
Pader Youth Net - YSS  
Women and Rural Development Network (WORUDET)  
Norwegian Refugee Council  
Coalition for Peace in Africa (COPA)  
Quaker Peace and Social Witness - Uganda  
Action for Humanity Africa  
Lamogi Can Tute Group  
Network for Peace - Building Initiatives (NPI)  
Kapelbyong Child and Mother Development Association  
Mpigi Women Development Trust (MWODET)  
RIAMRIAM CSN  
Youth Organisation for Humanity and Nature (YOHANA)  
Rural Initiative for Community Development (RICE)  
Grassroots Women's Association for Development  
Charity for Peace Foundation  
Foundation for Youth Transformation (FORTY)  
Community Integrated Forum for Moral and Social Transformation (CIFMOST)  
Family Integrated Services for Health and Development  
Rwot Oye Rural Development Organisation (RORDO)



## **CSOPNU**

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